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Abstract
Experimental research on decision making under risk has until now always employed choice
data in order to evaluate the empirical performance of expected utility and the alternative
non-expected utility theories. The present paper performs a similar analysis which relies on
pricing data instead of choice data. Since pricing data lead in many cases to a different
ordering of lotteries than choices (e.g. the preference reversal phenomenon) our analysis may
have fundamental different results than preceding investigations. We elicit three different
types of pricing data: willingness-to-pay, willingness-to-accept and certainty equivalents
under the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) incentive mechanism. One of our main result
shows that the comparative performance of the single theories differs significantly under
these three types of pricing data.
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1 Introduction. 
Since its axiomatization by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), the expected utility model 
has been the dominant framework for analyzing decision problems under risk and uncertainty. 
Starting with the well-known paradox of Allais (1953), however, a large body of experimental 
evidence has been gathered which indicates that individuals tend to violate the assumptions 
underlying the expected utility model systematically. This empirical evidence has motivated 
researchers  to  develop  alternative  theories  of  choice  under  risk  and  uncertainty  able  to 
accommodate the observed patterns of behavior. Nowadays a large number of alternative 
theories  exist  (cf.  Starmer  (2000),  Sugden  (2004),  and  Schmidt  (2004)  for  surveys)  and 
naturally the question arises which theory can accommodate observed choice behavior best. 
There exist many experimental studies comparing the empirical performance of the 
single alternatives, most notable seem to be the investigations of Harless and Camerer (1994) 
and Hey and Orme (1994). All of these existing studies we are aware of use individual choice 
data in order to evaluate the alternatives, i.e. individuals have mostly to perform pairwise 
choices between lotteries or, as in Carbone and Hey (1994), (1995), and Morone (2005) a 
complete ranking of a set of alternatives. However, apart from choices, the preferences of a 
decision maker can also be assessed by  pricing tasks.  Moreover, the main application of 
utility theories is not only to analyze real-world choice behavior but also real-world pricing 
behavior, for instance on financial markets. Therefore, it is rather striking that neither the 
validity of expected utility nor the comparative performance of the single alternatives has 
been systematically investigated with pricing data and the present paper aims to fill this gap. 
One could argue that choice and pricing tasks should in principle generate the same 
preference ordering for one individual and, therefore, it is irrelevant whether choice or pricing 
tasks are employed in the investigation. However, there is much evidence that pricing tasks 
yield, in general, different preferences than choice tasks for the same individual (Hey, Morone 
and Schmidt (2007)). The most prominent result in this context seems to be the preference 
reversal  phenomenon  which  was  first  observed  by  Lichtenstein  and  Slovic  (1971)  and 
afterwards  extensively  analyzed  in  the  economics  literature.  The  preference  reversal 
phenomenon employs two lotteries, a safe and a risky one, with roughly the same expected 
value. The typical pattern observed is that subjects tend to choose the riskless lottery but 
assign  a  higher  minimal  selling  price  to  the  risky  one.  Thus,  the  preference  reversal 
phenomenon  shows  clearly  that  choice  and  pricing  tasks  may  yield  completely  different 
preference orderings. This leads to the question whether the evidence against expected utility 
observed  with  choice  tasks  remains  valid  if  preferences  are  assessed  with  pricing  tasks. 
Moreover, the question arises whether alternative theories which perform well under choice 
tasks have to be rejected if pricing tasks are employed or, vice versa, whether some alternative 
with a poor performance so far emerges as an acceptable descriptive theory for pricing data.  
There exist different pricing tasks which can be employed in our analysis. The most 
prominent concepts are the willingness to pay (WTP), i.e. the maximal buying price for a 
lottery, and the willingness to accept (WTA), i.e. the minimal selling prices. The empirical 
literature  has  clearly  shown  that  both  concepts  yield  in  general  different  results.  More 
precisely, the WTA is in experimental studies in general much higher than the WTP (cf. e.g. 
Knetsch  and  Sinden  (1984)).  This  disparity  motivated  us  to  use  both  concepts  in  our 
investigation. A third concept which  has often been employed in order to elicit certainty 
equivalents for lotteries is the so called BDM mechanism (cf. Becker, DeGroot and Marschak 
(1963)).  Although  this  mechanism  is  closely  related  to  the  WTA  it  may  cause  different 
responses. Therefore, we also integrated the BDM in our analysis. 
Altogether, our study aims to investigate the empirical performance of expected utility 
and some of its alternatives by employing three different pricing tasks: WTP, WTA, and the 
BDM mechanism. Besides the BDM mechanism we also assessed the WTP and WTA with 
incentive compatible mechanisms, i.e. second-price auctions.   2 
The experimental design will be discussed in the next section. Section 3 explains our 
estimation procedure and presents the five preference functionals employed in the analysis, 
i.e. risk neutrality, expected utility, the theory of disappointment aversion, and two variants of 
rank-dependent  utility.  Section  4  presents  our  results  and,  finally,  section  5  contains  a 
concluding discussion. 
 
2. Experimental Design 
The experiment was conducted at the Centre of Experimental Economics at the University of 
York with 24 participants. Each participant had to attend five separate occasions, A, B, C, D, and 
E, but occasions A and B are irrelevant for the present analysis as they involved only pairwise 
choices. During five days of one week one of each five different occasions was offered on every 
single day with varying chronological order. Consequently, 25 occasions were offered altogether 
and the participants could choose on which days they attended which occasions.  
Each of the occasions  lasted between 25  and  40 minutes. The time varied not only 
between the single occasions but also across the subjects since they were explicitly encouraged 
to proceed at their own pace. After a subject had completed all five occasions one question of 
one occasion was selected randomly and played out for real. The average payment to the subjects 
was £34.17 with £80 being the highest and £0 being the lowest payment.  
On each of the five occasions the subjects were presented the same 56 lotteries presented 
in Table 1. The lotteries were presented as segmented circles on the computer screen. Figure 1 
presents an example (lottery 19) in which there is a 50% chance of getting £40, a 20% chance of 
getting £10, and a 30% chance of getting £30. If a subject received a particular lottery as reward 
he or she had to spin a wheel on the corresponding circle. The amount won was then determined 
by the segment of the circle in which the arrow on the wheel stopped.  
 
 
Table 1: The Lotteries 
No.  £0  £10  £30  £40  No.  £0  £10  £30  £40  No.  £0  £10  £30  £40 
1  .000  .000  1.000  .000  20  .000  .200  .700  .100  39  .000  .500  .000  .500 
2  .750  .000  .250  .000  21  .000  .000  .500  .500  40  .500  .250  .000  .250 
3  .300  .600  .100  .000  22  .500  .000  .500  .000  41  .200  .000  .400  .400 
4  .000  .600  .100  .300  23  .250  .500  .250  .000  42  .100  .000  .200  .700 
5  .000  1.000  .000  .000  24  .000  .500  .000  .500  43  .800  .000  .000  .200 
6  .000  .500  .500  .000  25  .500  .250  .000  .250  44  .400  .000  .500  .100 
7  .500  .500  .000  .000  26  .000  .250  .500  .250  45  .400  .000  .000  .600 
8  .000  .000  .700  .300  27  .000  .000  .750  .250  46  .700  .000  .000  .300 
9  .800  .000  .140  .060  28  .250  .250  .500  .000  47  .200  .000  .000  .800 
10  .200  .000  .740  .060  29  .200  .000  .000  .800  48  .200  .000  .400  .400 
11  .000  .200  .800  .000  30  .800  .000  .000  .200  49  .100  .000  .000  .900 
12  .500  .100  .400  .000  31  .320  .600  .000  .080  50  .600  .000  .000  .400 
13  .000  .200  .600  .200  32  .020  .600  .000  .380  51  .300  .500  .000  .200 
14  .000  .100  .300  .600  33  .700  .000  .000  .300  52  .200  .200  .000  .600 
15  .200  .800  .000  .000  34  .350  .000  .500  .150  53  .600  .100  .000  .300 
16  .100  .400  .500  .000  35  .850  .000  .000  .150  54  .000  .350  .000  .650 
17  .000  .400  .600  .000  36  .150  .000  .000  .850  55  .000  .100  .250  .650 
18  .500  .200  .300  .000  37  .830  .000  .000  .170  56  .250  .350  .000  .400 
19  .000  .200  .300  .500  38  .230  .000  .600  .170           
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Figure 1: The Presentation of Lotteries 
 
Recall that occasions A and B are irrelevant for the present analysis. In occasions C, D, 
and E the 56 lotteries appeared in randomized order on screen and subjects were asked for each 
lottery: 
•  to state their maximal buying price (WTP) in occasion C,  
•  to state their minimal selling price in occasion D, and 
•  to state their certainty equivalent under the BDM mechanism in occasion E. 
 
Let us describe the single occasions more detailed now. In occasion C the following 
question appeared under each lottery: “Submit your bid for this lottery in a second-price sealed-
bid auction.” That is subjects were asked to assume they did not have the lottery and had to bid 
to get it. They had to type in their bid and confirm it by pressing the return key. At the beginning 
of the experimental session subjects received a three-page instruction sheet. Then an audio-tape 
of  these  instructions  was  played  which  took  approximately  ten  minutes.  The  instructions 
explained clearly the rules and the incentive compatibility of second-price sealed-bid auctions. If 
a question of occasion C was selected for the reward, the subject received a payment of £y where 
y is the highest amount in the corresponding lottery. Moreover, if the subject submitted the 
highest bid among all subjects in the group with whom she completed occasion C, he or she 
would additionally play out the lottery and had to pay the second highest bid. Note that the 
payment of £y induces a house money effect (cf. Thaler and Johnston (1990)) which may bias 
our  elicitation  of  WTP.  However,  this  effect  is  difficult  to  avoid  if  the  subjects  should  be 
prevented from making losses. Occasion D was identical to occasion C except that for each 
lottery a different question was asked: “Submit your ask for this lottery in a second-price offer 
auction”.  That is subjects were asked to assume that they owned the lottery and had to make an 
offer to dispose of it.  Again subjects received a handout and had to listen to an audio-tape of the 
three-page instructions which explained clearly the rules and the incentive compatibility of the 
second-price offer auction. If a question from occasion D was selected for the reward, the subject 
could play out the corresponding lottery. However, if he or she submitted the lowest offer among 
all subjects in the group with whom she completed occasion D, he or she received the second 
lowest offer instead of the lottery. In occasion E the following question appeared under each 
lottery: “State the amount of money such that you do not care whether you will receive this 
amount or the lottery”. If a question of occasion E was chosen as reward we employed the 
standard BDM mechanism: A number z was randomly drawn between zero and y where y is the 
highest possible prize in the given lottery. If z was greater or equal to the answer, the subject 
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received a handout and had to listen to an audio-tape of the instructions which clearly explained 
the rules and the incentive compatibility of the BDM mechanism. 
Since subjects participated in the experiment at five different occasions it is important to 
mention that all recruited subjects had to show up for all sessions and they did so. 
 
3. Estimation Procedure: Two Possible Alternatives 
In order to estimate subjects’ preference functional we can follow two alternative routes: the 
“fictitious gamble technique” (FGT) and the “interpolation technique” (IT). On a priori grounds 
it is difficult to say which technique is superior. In this section we will present both techniques, 
and their advantages and disadvantages 
 
3.1. The Fictitious Gamble Technique (FGT) 
FGT is an attempt to apply the estimation technique of Hey and Orme (1994) for choice data to 
pricing data. In FGT the information gathered in a pricing task experiment is transformed into 
choice data as follows. Let assume we ask for the certain equivalent (CE) of lottery A and the 
subject reports CE(A) = 34. From this information FGT concludes that the subject in a pairwise 
choice would prefer lottery A to a lottery B which pays for sure an amount of 33, and also would 
prefer a lottery C which pays for sure 35 to lottery A. Obviously, FGT has some disadvantages: 
Contra 1: There is a loss of information since the certain equivalent of lottery A contains more 
information than the observations that A is preferred to B, and C is preferred to A. 
Solution
1:  We  can  generate  more  synthetic  lotteries  than  B  and  C  in  order  to  reduce  the 
information  loss;  in  principle,  as  the  number  of  synthetic  lotteries  goes  to  infinity,  the 
information loss would approach zero. 
Contra 2: The derived pairwise choices are not real data and do not provide a basis for empirical 
analysis since people often make errors or choice not compatible with pricing behavior. 
Solution:  We  do  not  advocate  that  the  information  we  get  from  the  synthetic  lotteries  is 
consistent with actual choice behavior. We just claim that the certainty equivalents provide a 
ranking of lotteries in the pricing task and the utility functions we estimate will reflect these 
ranking. If there are errors or biases in the pricing task, they will be reflected in our synthetic 
data. 
Pro:  We  do  not  need  to  make  any  assumptions  concerning  the  functional  form  of  utility 
functions. 
 
3.1.1 Some Technical Details on the FGT Estimation 
The estimation of the parameters of the utility function from pairwise choice data follows the 
procedure adopted in Hey and Orme (1994). Let us restrict attention to expected utility and 
denote the two lotteries in the pairwise choice by L and R. Expected utility for the lotteries is 
denoted  by  by  EU(L)  and  EU(R)  respectively. Then,  if  there  is  no  noise  or error  in  the 
subject’s responses, he or she will report LfR or RfL, if and only if EU(L)> EU(R) or 
EU(R) > EU(L), respectively. This is equivalent to saying that L or R is reported as preferred 
if and only if CE(L) > CE(R) or CE(R) > CE(L) respectively. However, as we know from the 
existing literature, subjects’ responses are typically affected by noise. We assume that this 
noise also affects certainty equivalents. Let us denote the error in measuring the difference 
between the certainty equivalents by ε. With this error the subject will report a preference for 
L, if and only if CE(L) - CE(R) + ε > 0, that is, if and only if ε > CE(R) - CE(L); he or she 
will report a preference for R, if and only if CE(L) - CE(R) + ε < 0, that is, if and only if ε < 
CE(R) - CE(L). We can now write the probability that the subject reports a preference for L as 
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Prob{ε > CE(R) - CE(L)}, and the he or she probability that the subject reports a preference 
for R as Prob{ε < CE(R) - CE(L)}.  
To proceed to the estimation of the parameters using maximum likelihood methods, 
we need to specify the distribution of the measurement error. We assume this to be normally 
distributed with mean 0 and variance s
2. The magnitude of s measures the noisiness of the 
subject’s responses: if s = 0 then the subject makes no mistakes – as s increases, the noise 
gets larger and larger. In the limit, when s is infinite, there is no information content in the 
subject’s  responses.  There  is  a  slight  complication  when  the  subject  reports  indifference. 
Following Hey and Orme (1994) we assume that those subjects expressing indifference do so 
when - τ < CE(L) - CE(R) + ε < τ where τ is some threshold. We estimate τ along with the 
other parameters. 
 
3.2. The Interpolation Technique (IT) 
The IT uses the certainty equivalents directly from estimation. If W is the preference functional 
and  CE(A)  the  certainty  equivalent  of  lottery  A  one  could  simply  take  the  equation                     
CE = W
-1(W(A)) as basis for the estimation. Compared to FGT, here the problem occurs that the 
stated  certainty  equivalent  will  in  general  lie  between  two  of  the  outcomes  used  for  the 
estimation which makes interpolation necessary. This leads to the following disadvantages: 
Contra 1: We need to prespecify a functional form for the utility function of each subject.  
Solution: We could repeat the estimation using many different functional forms and choose (for 
each subject) the one that fit data best. 
Contra 2: We need a utility function which is invertible, otherwise we cannot apply IT. 
Solution: We can restrict attention to functional forms which are invertible. 
Pro: We are using all the information contained in the data. 
 
3.2.1 Some Technical Details on the IT Estimation 
For the certainty equivalent methods, we follow the same route as above. If the subject is 
asked to provide his or her certainty equivalent  for some gamble A, we assume  that the 
subject calculates the expected utility of the gamble, EU(A), according to his or her utility 
function, and then calculates the certainty equivalent V - that is, certain amount of money that 
yields the same utility. We can now write V = u
-1(EU(A)). Incorporating errors as above, we 
get V = u
-1(EU(A)) + ε. Hence, the probability density of V being reported as the certainty 
equivalent of the gamble is given by f[V - u
-1(EU(A))], where f(.) is the probability density 
function of ε. If we now make the same assumption about the distribution of the measurement 
error ε - namely that it is N(0,s
2) – we can now proceed to the estimation of the parameters of 
the utility function.  
It  is  evident  that  we  need  some  assumptions  on  the  utility  function:  it  has  to  be 
invertible.  We could assume  that  subjects  have  a  constant  relative  risk  aversion  (CRRA) 
utility function and adopt the following specific form, which embodies the normalisation that 
u(0) = 0 and u(40) = 1: 
u(x) = (x/40) 
r 
We need to estimate only the parameter r (the relative risk aversion coefficient) as it fully 
describes the utility function of the individual. As noted above, we assume that the standard 
deviation of the noise - that is, the magnitude of s - is different for the different elicitation 
methods (i.e. choice and price), and we estimate them individually. 
 
3.3. A Comparison of FGT and IT 
To explore the non-trivial problem which of the two estimation techniques is superior we run a 
Montecarlo simulation. The simulation technique is as follows: we chose a particular utility 
function  (i.e.  u(x)  =  x
1/2)  and  calculated  the  preferences  between  the  lotteries  used  in  our 
experimental design as well as the certainty equivalents resulting from this utility function in the   6 
expected utility framework. Then we estimated the resulting utility values for both estimation 
techniques. 
 
Table 2: The Simulation 
  FGT  IT 
  u(10)  u(30)  u(10)  u(30) 
Mean  3.1206  5.5081  3.4500  5.5756 
Variance  0.0313  0.0848  0.0030  0.0014 
Bias  0.0017  0.0009  0.0828  0.0096 
MSE  0.0330  0.0857  0.0858  0.0111 
 
Table 2 reports mean and variance of the estimated utility values for both techniques. The bias of 
each estimator is given by the estimated utility value minus the true utility value, i.e. x
1/2. It turns 
out that IT estimators have a higher bias but a smaller variance. Comparing the mean squared 
error (MSE) of the two estimators we have to prefer FGT to estimate u(10) and IT to estimate 
u(30). We can, therefore, conclude that no method is strictly superior to the other.  
Since in contrast to our simulation we do not know in general the right functional form of 
utility functions, we decided to use the FGT to estimate preference functionals. We derived from 
our pricing data 504 pairwise preference statements for each subject and each occasion. These 
preference  statements  are  the  data  basis  for  our  estimation.  More  precisely,  we  used  the 
maximum likelihood method to estimate the parameters of the single preference functionals. The 
estimation was performed by a special program we wrote using the GAUSS software package
2.  
 
3.4. The preference functionals 
Now we want to present the preference functionals used in our analysis. Let x = {x1, x2, …, xn} 
be the extended vector of outcomes. Since we used the certainty equivalents to derive pairwise 
preference  statements  our  data  involve  always  two  lotteries  which  are  represented  by  two 
probability vectors denoted by p = {p1, p2, …, pn} and q = {q1, q2, …, qn}. Let W denote the 
subject’s  preference  functional  and  V(p,  q)  :=  W(p)-W(q)  the  relative  evaluation  or  net 
preference functional. If a particular subject actually prefers p to q then her or his net preference 
functional obviously will be positive. On the other hand, if she or he actually prefers q to p, V(p, 
q) will be negative. Finally, we have V(p, q) = 0 in the case of indifference. In reality subjects’ 
derived preferences are determined by: 
V*(p, q) = V(p, q) + ε , 
where   ε  is an error term. We assume that ε  is symmetric and has a mean of zero.  
  The first model we have estimated is risk neutrality (RN) given by 





i i i x q p k
1
ε .               
For RN we have to estimate only the parameter k which is the relative magnitude of subjects’ 
errors. For expected utility (EU) we have  




i i i x u q p
2
.             
We normalized u(x1), i.e. utility of zero, to zero, and the variance of the error term to one. We did 
the same also for the three alternative theories presented below. Under this procedure a subject 
who makes relatively small errors will have relatively large values for u(xi) whereas a subject 
who makes relatively large errors will have relatively small values for u(xi). 
  The third model is the theory of disappointment aversion (DA) introduced by Gul (1991). 
The main psychological motivation of this theory is the hypothesis that choice behavior tries to 
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avoid disappointment  where disappointment occurs if the actual outcome of the lottery is lower 
than the certainty equivalent. In our framework, DA is characterized by the following equation 
(see also Hey and Orme (1994)) 
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min q , p * : .   
The parameter β is the additional parameter which determines the degree of disappointment 
aversion. If β= 0 DA reduce to EU. 
  We now turn to rank-dependent utility which is nowadays the most prominent alternative 
to EU. Note that rank-dependent utility is in our analysis equivalent to cumulative prospect 
theory since our outcome set does not involve losses. As Hey and Orme (1994) we estimate two 
variants  of  rank-dependent  utility,  one  with  a  power  weighting  function  and  one  with  the 
weighting function proposed by Quiggin (1982). 
For rank-dependence with power function (RP) the weighting function w is given by w(r) = r
γ 
and we have 
 
RP:  V*(p, q) =  ( ) ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
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Note that if γ = 1 RP reduce to EU.  
 
For rank-dependence with ´Quiggin` weighting function (RQ) the weighting function is given by 
w(r) = r
γ / [r
γ + (1 – r)
γ]
1/γ, which yields 
 
RQ:  V*(p, q) = 






















































































































































































































































































RQ reduces to EU if γ = 1.  
 
4. Results 
In our analysis we can distinguish 15 different models given by the combination of the five 
preference functionals with the three different elicitation methods. Table A1 in the appendix is 
concerned with the question which model represents individual preference best and reports for 
all of the 24 subjects the precise ranking of the models in terms of their goodness of fit (as 
measured by the Akaike criterion). Since it is difficult to observe a clear structure in this table it 
supports the hypothesis that “people are different”. In order to get a clearer picture, we calculated 
the average rankings
3 of all 15 models in order to evaluate their performance. Table 3 lists the 
single models ordered according to increasing average rank. The first conclusion which emerges 
from this table is the fact that BDM performs rather well since the models on the first three ranks 
                                                            
3 When we calculated the average rankings two models got the same rank if they performed identical. If for 
example two models have the highest Akaike criterion they both get the first rank and the next model gets rank 
three. For this reason the average of the average ranks may differ from the rank average.   8 
are all based on BDM. Secondly, it seems to be obvious that RN has a rather poor performance 
since all models with RN are on the last ranks; this finding is consistent with Hey and Orme 
(1994) where the performance of several preference functional was compared on the basis of 
choice data. Hey and Orme showed that RN appear to be the worst preference functional. The 
third and possibly the most important conclusion from Table 3 is the fact that the performance of 
a preference functional depends crucially on the employed elicitation method. RQ is for instance, 
as for choice data analyzed in the study of Hey and Orme (1994), the best preference functional 
in terms of average rank. However, in the present study this is only true if RQ is combined with 
BDM. In contrast, combined with WTP or WTA, RQ turns out to be the worst model apart from 
RN. This clearly shows that does not exist one “best” preference functional for all tasks but 
instead for different tasks different preference functional perform better. The last conclusion 
from Table 3 which is also in line with the results of Hey and Orme (1994) is the fact that EU 
does not seem to perform substantially worse than the alternative preference functionals.  
 
Table 3: Average ranks of the single models 
RQ  RP  EU  DA  DA  RP  DA  EU  EU  RP  RQ  RQ  RN  RN  RN 
BDM  BDM  BDM  WTP  BDM  WTP  WTA  WTP  WTA  WTA  WTP  WTA  BDM  WTA  WTP 
6,083 6,125  6,292 6,417 6,833  7,167 7,542 7,667 7,875 7,917 8,042 8,375 9,375 11,625 12,125 
 
Since the performance of the single preference functionals depends on the employed elicitation 
method we analyzed in Table 4 each elicitation method separately. More precisely, the first row 
of Table 4 reports the average rank of each preference functional if we elicit preferences using 
WTP;  the  second  row  reports  the  average  rank  of  each  preference  functional  if  we  elicit 
preferences using WTA and the last row refers to BDM. 
 
Table 4: Ranking of the preference functionals 
  RN  EU  DA  RQ  RP 
WTP  3.958  2.592  2.230  2.417  2.833 
WTA  4.292  2.792  2.417  2.625  2.667 
BDM  4.417  2.708  2.917  2.458  1.833 
 
Table 4 show that RN is for all elicitation methods the worst preference functional in terms of 
average ranks. For WTP and WTA DA turns out to be best while it performs rather poorly under 
BDM where RP turns out to be best. Since in DA a reference point plays a prominent role the 
bad  performance of  DA  under BDM may  possibly  due  to  the fact that the  reference  point 
receives less attention under BDM as compared to WTP and WTA. The fact that RP is the best 
preference  functional  under  BDM  but  performs  rather  poorly  under  WTP  reinforces  our 
conclusion  from  above  that  the  performance  of  the  single  preference  functionals  depends 
crucially on the elicitation method. Altogether, Table 4 also show that EU does not perform 
substantially worse than its alternatives. When comparing our results on the performance of the 
various preference models, to the results from the choice elicitation literature we refer to the 
study of Hey and Orme (1994) since their method is closest to ours. Inspecting their ranking in 
Table VII, we see that RQ is best, then there come RP and EU while DA turns out to be worst. 
These results are comparable to our results for BDM since here only the ranking between RQ 
and RP is reversed. Since we get fundamentally different results for WTP and WTA, BDM 
seems to be the pricing method which generates the results which are closest to choice data.  
 
Finally we are interested in the question which elicitation method is best for the single preference 
functionals. Corresponding information is provided in Table 5. For instance the first row of 
Table 5 reports the average rank of each elicitation method for RN. Subsequent rows contain the 
same information for EU, DA, RQ, and RP respectively.    9 
Table 5: Ranking of the elicitation methods 
  WTP  WTA  BDM 
RN  2.417  2.042  1.417 
EU  1.958  2.125  1.708 
DA  1.875  2.042  1.833 
RQ  1.958  2.042  1.792 
PR  1.958  2.125  1.958 
 
It turns out that BDM is always the best elicitation method both in terms of average rank (and 
also in terms of number of subjects for which a given elicitation method is best). Additionally, 
according to these two criteria, WTP is except for RN always better than WTA. The latter result 
may  have  some  conclusions  for  the  contingent  valuation  method.  Until  now  it  is  an  open 
question whether contingent valuation surveys should rely on WTP or WTA. Some authors have 
argued in favor of WTP since WTA usually decreases during experiments whereas WTP remains 




In this paper we have analyzed the empirical performance of several preference functionals. The 
main difference with existing studies in the literature is the fact that we used pricing data instead 
of choice data. Our main results can be summarized as follows: 
•  The performance of the single preference functionals depends crucially on the elicitation 
method. 
•  EU does not perform substantially worse than its alternatives 
•  DA turns out to be the best preference functional under WTP and WTA while RP is best 
under BDM. 
•  BDM seems to be the best elicitation method and WTA the worst.   10 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Overall rankings 
Rank   I  II  III  IV  V  VI  VII  VIII  IX  X  XI  XII  XIII  XIV  XV 
Subject 1  RQ-BDM  EU-BDM  RP-BDM  DA-BDM  RN-BDM  DA-WTP  RP-WTP  EU-WTP  RQ-WTP  RP-WTA  DA-WTA  RQ-WTA  EU-WTA  RN-WTP  RN-WTA 
Subject 2  RP-BDM  EU-WTA  RQ-BDM  RQ-WTA  RP-WTA  DA-WTA  EU-BDM  DA-BDM  RP-WTP  DA-WTP  RN-BDM  RQ-WTP  EU-WTP  RN-WTA  RN-WTP 
Subject 3  EU-WTA  EU-BDM  DA-BDM  RP-WTA  RP-BDM  RQ-WTA  RQ-BDM  DA-WTA  RN-WTA  RN-BDM  RN-WTP  EU-WTP  RP-WTP  RQ-WTP  DA-WTP 
Subject 4  EU-BDM  RQ-BDM  EU-WTA  RQ-WTA  RP-BDM  DA-BDM  DA-WTA  RP-WTA  RN-BDM  RN-WTA  DA-WTP  RP-WTP  RQ-WTP  EU-WTP  RN-WTP 
Subject 5  RQ-WTA  RP-WTA  EU-WTA  DA-WTA  RQ-BDM  RP-BDM  EU-BDM  DA-WTP  DA-BDM  RP-WTP  RQ-WTP  EU-WTP  RN-BDM  RN-WTA  RN-WTP 
Subject 6  RP-WTA  DA-WTA  RQ-WTA  EU-WTA  RP-WTP  DA-WTP  RQ-WTP  EU-WTP  RP-BDM  DA-BDM  RQ-BDM  EU-BDM  RN-BDM  RN-WTA  RN-WTP 
Subject 7  DA-BDM  RP-BDM  RQ-BDM  EU-BDM  RN-BDM  DA-WTA  RN-WTA  RN-WTP  RP-WTA  RQ-WTP  EU-WTP  EU-WTA  DA-WTP  RQ-WTA  RP-WTP 
Subject 8  EU-WTA  RQ-WTA  DA-WTA  RP-WTA  RQ-WTP  RP-WTP  EU-WTP  DA-WTP  RN-WTP  RN-WTA  DA-BDM  RP-BDM  RQ-BDM  EU-BDM  RN-BDM 
Subject 9  RN-WTP  DA-WTP  EU-WTP  RQ-WTP  RP-WTP  DA-WTA  EU-WTA  RQ-WTA  RP-WTA  RN-WTA  DA-BDM  RQ-BDM  RP-BDM  EU-BDM  RN-BDM 
Subject 10  RQ-BDM  EU-BDM  RP-BDM  DA-BDM  RN-BDM  RP-WTA  EU-WTA  DA-WTP  DA-WTA  RP-WTP  RQ-WTA  RN-WTA  EU-WTP  RQ-WTP  RN-WTP 
Subject 11  DA-WTP  RP-WTP  RQ-BDM  EU-WTP  RQ-WTP  DA-WTA  RP-WTA  EU-BDM  RP-BDM  DA-BDM  RQ-WTA  EU-WTA  RN-BDM  RN-WTP  RN-WTA 
Subject 12  DA-WTP  RQ-WTP  EU-WTP  RP-WTP  RQ-BDM  EU-BDM  DA-BDM  RP-BDM  RQ-WTA  EU-WTA  DA-WTA  RP-WTA  RN-WTA  RN-WTP  RN-BDM 
Subject 13  EU-WTP  DA-WTP  RP-WTP  RQ-WTP  RQ-BDM  EU-BDM  RP-BDM  DA-BDM  RN-BDM  DA-WTA  RP-WTA  RQ-WTA  EU-WTA  RN-WTA  RN-WTP 
Subject 14  EU-WTP  RP-WTP  RQ-WTP  DA-WTP  DA-WTA  RP-WTA  EU-WTA  RQ-WTA  RP-BDM  RQ-BDM  EU-BDM  DA-BDM  RN-WTA  RN-WTP  RN-BDM 
Subject 15  RQ-WTA  RP-WTA  DA-WTA  EU-WTA  RP-WTP  RQ-WTP  DA-WTP  EU-WTP  RQ-BDM  RP-BDM  DA-BDM  EU-BDM  RN-BDM  RN-WTA  RN-WTP 
Subject 16  RP-BDM  DA-BDM  RQ-BDM  RP-WTP  EU-BDM  DA-WTP  RQ-WTP  EU-WTP  DA-WTA  RP-WTA  EU-WTA  RQ-WTA  RN-BDM  RN-WTA  RN-WTP 
Subject 17  DA-BDM  RQ-BDM  EU-BDM  RP-BDM  RN-BDM  RQ-WTA  RP-WTA  DA-WTA  EU-WTA  RN-WTA  EU-WTP  RQ-WTP  RP-WTP  RN-WTP  DA-WTP 
Subject 18  EU-BDM  RQ-BDM  DA-BDM  RP-BDM  RN-BDM  RP-WTP  DA-WTP  RQ-WTP  RQ-WTA  EU-WTP  RP-WTA  EU-WTA  DA-WTA  RN-WTA  RN-WTP 
Subject 19  RQ-BDM  EU-BDM  RP-BDM  DA-BDM  RQ-WTP  EU-WTP  RP-WTP  DA-WTP  RN-BDM  RP-WTA  RQ-WTA  EU-WTA  DA-WTA  RN-WTP  RN-WTA 
Subject 20  RN-WTP  RN-BDM  RN-WTA  EU-WTP  EU-WTA  EU-BDM  DA-WTP  DA-WTA  DA-BDM  RP-WTP  RP-WTA  RP-BDM  RQ-WTP  RQ-WTA  RQ-BDM 
Subject 21  RN-BDM  EU-BDM  DA-BDM  RP-BDM  RQ-BDM  RN-WTA  EU-WTA  RP-WTA  DA-WTA  RQ-WTA  RP-WTP  DA-WTP  EU-WTP  RQ-WTP  RN-WTP 
Subject 22  RN-WTP  RN-BDM  EU-WTP  EU-BDM  DA-WTP  DA-WTA  DA-BDM  RP-WTP  RP-BDM  RQ-WTP  RQ-WTA  RQ-BDM  RN-WTA  EU-WTA  RP-WTA 
Subject 23  RN-WTP  RQ-WTP  EU-WTP  RP-WTP  DA-WTP  DA-WTA  EU-WTA  RP-WTA  RN-WTA  RQ-WTA  RP-BDM  RQ-BDM  RN-BDM  EU-BDM  DA-BDM 
Subject 24  RP-WTP  DA-WTP  RQ-WTP  RQ-BDM  DA-BDM  EU-BDM  RP-BDM  EU-WTP  RN-BDM  DA-WTA  RN-WTA  RQ-WTA  EU-WTA  RP-WTA  RN-WTP 
 
 